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ISIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY
Growing threats and worldwide influences of jihadist organizations such as the Is­
lamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rely on ideological, military, financial and opera­
tional capacities. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS responded to insurgents’ 
hopes and offered new concept of jihad and implementation of sharia regulations as 
well as establishment of the historic caliphate. Moreover, seizure of large parts of Syria 
and Iraq, support of Sunni communities and hostility against Shia population, as well as 
terror campaign and brutal executions reinforced the position of the organization and 
defined new forms of jihad compared to dignity, bravery, honor and adventure. So far, 
more than 30 different groups, including insurgents from Asia and Africa have taken an 
oath to al-Baghdadi al-Baghdadi (Feakin, Wilkinson, 2015: 7-8).
However, ISIS could not succeed without appropriate propaganda and communica­
tion strategies that enabled to recruit and inspire insurgents, including foreign volun­
teers. In fact, ISIS is the first organization, which exploits effectively propaganda and 
media tools like Internet websites, online journals or social medias and new communi­
cation technologies. Besides, propaganda techniques play a crucial role in motivation 
and agitation process that encourages young persons to join the battlefield in Syria and 
Iraq and to carry out terrorist attacks in the West. The series of terror acts that occurred 
in France in 2015 (Callimachi, Yardley, 2015) and the Brussels bombings in 2016 
(Khomami, 2016).
ISIS communication strategy reflects the following channels:
-  Liturgical speeches and classic Arabic rhetoric;
-  Official media channels;
-  Internet forums and social medias;
-  Encrypted communication.
LITURGICAL SPEECHES AND CLASSIC ARABIC RHETORIC
The liturgical sermon called khutba in Arabic is one of the oldest narrative and oratory 
forms in the Arab and Muslim world. It is presented in mosques during Friday’s prayer or 
on special occasions of feasts and holidays. Basic narration and stylistic features reflect 
two parts of the speech. The first one regards short prayers, religious invocations and cita­
tions of Quranic verses. It is always followed by the expression: wa ba’d  (and then; after­
wards), which indicates separation between passages in the speech. The second part is 
delivered after a short break and it is the main fragment of the sermon. It usually concerns 
religious and moral values or social questions such as unemployment, drug abuse, orga­
nized crime or family crisis and positive values of Islam. Discussions are based on the
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Quran and hadiths (stories, statements and report attributed to the Prophet Mohammad) 
or various allegories and examples from history and everyday life. The speech is con­
cluded by other religious citations (Jones, 2012: 195-232).
Moreover, the central fragment of the sermon also reflect implementation of rhetori­
cal devices (balagha in Arabic) regarding different forms of narration and composi­
tions, appropriate words and arguments as well as rhetorical figures like comparisons, 
metaphors, repetitions or antithesis (Gaffney, 1994: 271-293).
Khutba also includes some non-verbal devices and speaker’s attributes such as theo­
logical skills, respect among believers, presentation of the sermon in liturgical podium 
above the auditorium as well as sacral clothes during the speech or balanced voice and 
gestures (Jones, 2012: 195-232).
It should be pointed out that religious discourse was often politicized by Islamist 
groups, which used the structure of khutba or balagha to present political messages in 
the second part of the speech. Traditional liturgical discourse has also affected Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi who applied the concept of the sermon in his official speeches. The 
sermon delivered in Ramadan 2014, in which he announced the establishment of the ca­
liphate is a good example in that context (Strange, 2014). Contrary to previous jihadist 
leaders, al-Baghdadi respected all conventions and etiquettes regarding non-verbal and 
narration features of khutba (Jones, 2012: 195-232).
His sermon was presented in classic Arabic in the main mosque in Mosul above the 
auditorium in liturgical podium. Al-Baghdadi was wearing sacral clothes and he was 
standing up at the first step 67 of speech and then he was sitting down during other parts 
of the discourse. He also avoided loud voices, chaotic gestures or reactions and he used 
index fingers to precise or underlines some questions.
Apart from personal skills, al-Baghdadi followed strict narration and stylistic de­
vices of khutba and balagha. He started his speech with religious invocations and cita­
tions and after a short break he refers to main subjects concerning spiritual values of the 
holy month, which absolves from all sins and rehabilitates human souls. Ramadan 
was confronted with specific concept of jihad described by al-Baghdadi as scarified 
efforts facilitating defeat of enemies and implementation of Islam values and the his­
toric caliphate.
Furthermore, Al-Baghdadi’s opinions were followed by appropriate argumentations 
based on sources such as the Quran, hadiths or citations of noble personalities from the 
history of Muslim empires. For examples, he refers to the speech of the Caliph Abu 
Bakr who became the first Muslim Caliph from 632 to 634 following the Prophet Mu­
hammad’s death. Al-Baghdadi appeals to the famous speech of Abu Bakr after seizure 
of power: “I have been given the authority over you, and I am not the best of you. If I do 
well, help me; and if I do wrong, set me right. Sincere regard for truth is loyalty and dis­
regard for truth is treachery. The weak amongst you shall be strong with me until I have 
secured his rights, if God will; and the strong amongst you shall be weak with me until
I have wrested from him the rights of others, if God will. Obey me so long as I obey God 
and His Messenger. But if I disobey God and His Messenger, ye owe me no obedience. 
Arise for your prayer, God have mercy upon you’’ (Munir, 2005: 39-40).
Al-Baghdadi avoided straight political messages but the appeal to the symbolic 
speech of Abu Bakr enabled to authorize the new Caliphate and to justify ISIS policy
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regarding violent implementation of sharia laws, executions of hostages and religious 
minorities. It should be pointed out that al-Baghdadi’s speech was addressed to local 
audiences that have been used to traditional and liturgical discourse. Furthermore, the 
religious features strengthened ISIS political messages and they stimulated allegiance 
of rival jihadist groups and recruitment of new insurgents.
OFFICIAL MEDIA CHANNELS
ISIS has implemented some innovative forms of propaganda that includes new technol­
ogies such as TV channels, radio stations or sophisticated online magazines issued in PDF 
versions. It should be pointed out that all sources are available in different free Web hosting 
or uploading sites. They are released in multilingual versions in order to attract wide audi­
ence, especially young militants from Western countries (Daninos, 2015: 10-14).
Dabiq magazine became an important communication platform for radical Islamists 
around the world (Jihadology, 2015). The name refers to the historic Battle of Maij Dabiq 
near Aleppo in Syria. In 1516 the Ottoman army conquered most of the Middle East, which 
encompassed the entire region of Syria and built the new Empire (Gray, 1975: 14-15).
Instead of long theological and political discussions, the magazine contains short 
messages based on suggestive graphics and provocative pictures similar to tabloid 
press or comics. Cover and first pages from the magazine usually present main head­
lines, including slogans regarding policy and strategy ofthe new caliphate. Statements, 
manifestos and short reports are always followed by photos illustrating ISIS successful 
offensives and campaigns in Syria and Iraq, images of wounded soldiers among fires 
and explosions as well as victorious parades of militants in controlled cities or harvest 
campaign and distribution of food and water. Other pictures show brutal executions of 
Shia prisoners, representatives of Christian and Yazidi communities or some colorful 
and sophisticated graphics showing spectacular terrorist attacks around the world. The 
pictures are followed by symbolic sentences such as: “Khalifa declared”, “A new era 
has arrived” or: “It’s either the Islamic state ofthe flood” (Jihadology, 2015).
The Dabiq respects traditional concept of propaganda popularized by previous 
jihadist leaders such as Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For example, differ­
ent opponents are usually called °alibiyyun (crusaders), taghut (a devil, a Satan) or 
kuffar (sinners) and murtaddun (apostates). The meanings are already known for radi­
cal Islamists, who compare Western and local authorities to the Devil, sins, immorality, 
crusaders wars or Zionism. Furthermore, the Dabiq presents transliterations of the 
Arabic words without English equivalents in order to conserve stylistic traditions of 
jihadist propaganda and to identify symbolic meanings that unite and strengthen ISIS 
insurgents and followers. It should be also pointed out, that ISIS hijacked the stylistic 
and linguistic concept of the Inspire magazine issued by Anwar al-Awlaqi who has 
been killed in 2011 by drone attack on his convoy in Jawf province, Yemen (Koplowitz, 
2013). Sophisticated and modern style of the Inspire magazine contained short mes­
sages in English based on suggestive graphics and significant pictures similar to tabloid 
press or comics and graffiti. The slogans exposed in the journals usually refer to martyr­
dom and bravery of militants as well as destructive activities of Western countries.
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Apart from online journals and magazines ISIS broadcasts the radio station called 
al-Bayan (Statement) and TV station al-Hayat Media Center as well as the Internet ser­
vice Amaq Ikhbariyya (Depth of Information). The audiovisual tools enable to imple­
ment sophisticated programs and headlines, including high quality pictures, graphics 
and videos regarding statements on terrorist attacks, short multilingual reports from 
battlefields in Syria and Iraq, brutal executions of hostages as well as manifestos glori­
fying attacks against enemies and implementation of ISIS laws and regulation in con­
trolled territories (Ajroudi, 2015).
For example, some media sources present modifications of heroes and graphics ap­
pearing in popular video games or Hollywood films. They are attributed to local fighters 
who are compared in that way to brave and famous heroes fighting with brutal enemies.
ISIS official media channels also include statements, which are often similar to war re­
ports. They usually contain dates and type of attacks as well as number of casualties among 
security forces and civilians. However, descriptions and updates are always followed by ap­
propriate graphics, pictures, color scheme and logotype that identify the organization.
INTERNET FORUMS AND SOCIAL MEDIA
Internet forums and social medias became a popular form of communication among 
ISIS militants, sympathizers or neutral Internet users interested in current events in the 
Arab-Muslim world. Besides, those devices create an alternative for formal statements 
and they facilitate informal communication, that includes short commentaries, sophis­
ticated pictures and videos or sublime religious chants (Rudner, 2016: 8-25).
Moreover, social medias play and important role during terrorist attacks. Particular ter­
rorist plot generates various posts and tweets that intensify fears, suspicions and informa­
tion chaos among audiences and authorities. Internet messages include unconfirmed 
threats, exaggerated data and descriptions. In this regard, it is hard to manage and to sepa­
rate true or false messages. It is also difficult to identify whether particular message is 
posted by jihadist militants, sympathizers of jihadism or neutral Internet users. This type of 
communication is often applied before official statements delivered after terrorist attacks.
ISIS also exploits Twitter networks instead of Facebook or Instagram profiles be­
cause in their opinions they have poor security and encrypting tools. ISIS Twitter pro­
files contain appropriate avatars and materials that demonstrate jihadist objectives. 
Every tweet generates other posts and profiles reflecting common ideas regarding glo­
rification of ISIS fighters and condemnation of local and Western authorities or threats 
of future attacks (ibidem).
Furthermore, ISIS militants can freely express their opinions, manifestos, graphics 
and videos. The new phenomenon was obvious during the terrorist attack against the 
Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris in January 2015. ISIS followers published a tragic 
photo of a dead policemen lying on the ground. It referred to first headlines from the at­
tack showing a terrorist shooting a police officer who tried to help people executed in 
the editorial board of the Charlie Hebdo. Twitter accounts used by ISIS released the pic­
ture of the killed policeman with short inscriptions: “If we do not revenge the Prophet, 
we do not will know prosperity” and: “The attack against the newspaper which pub­
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lished pictures insulting the Prophet” (Twitter, 2015). The commentaries explained and 
justified the attacks and they glorified ISIS strategy against Western countries support­
ing antiterrorist coalition in the Middle East.
The violent response to the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad published by the 
magazine has created an useful religious background for al-Baghdadi’s organization, which 
tried to provoke French forces and engage them in Syria. Indeed, after the terrorist attacks 
in January and November 2015, France started airstrikes in Syria (Irish, Vidalon, 2015). It 
should be also noted that the tragic image of the policemen and the inscriptions affected 
other, similar tweets that emphasized the sense of revenge and victory over the enemy.
Picture 1. The example of the Tweet regarding the attacks 
against the Charlie Hebdo magazine
Source: Twitter (2015), http://www.twitter.com/ss20y4_zz/status/ 
5529008774030454784 (14.05.2016).
According to the United States Department of Defense there are around 6,000 active 
ISIS users. Some surveys estimate 46,000 ISIS supporters who use Twitter accounts 
(Astorino-Courtois, Canna, 2015: 11-13). It is also more and more difficult to identify 
potential supporters, militants and terrorists because they use various avatars, profiles, 
symbols and particular words that unite them and facilitate communication and ex­
change of materials. Moreover, blocking of Twitter accounts are ineffective because 
suspended profiles are replaced by new users who often change their avatars, profiles 
and settings of the account.
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It should be pointed out that jihadist communication in Twitter relies on appropriate 
Arabic words and phrases applied as hashtags. They usually refer to the following 
items: khilâfa (caliphate) and dawla islâmiyya (Islamic State), ju n d al-khilâfa (soldiers 
of the caliphate) or they are derivated from the popular jihadist websites such as amaq 
ikhbariyya, shabakat al-jihâd al-alamiyyi (worldwide jihadi network) and anrâr 
al-mujahidûn (followers of mujahedeen)1. The examples are often modified and they 
include additional epithets in Arabic in case ofblocking and suspension ofthe websites. 
However, the derivations enable to find and to renew the communication in blocked 
Internet services.
Many Tweets include different statements, threats and short commentaries posted 
after particular terrorist attacks. The accounts are usually attributed to the hashtag 
ghazwa mubâraka (blessed invasion) with an appropriate name of the country affected 
by terrorist threats and attacks. Some hashtags refer to well-known names of opponents 
like crusaders, sinners and apostates. The meanings refer to heroic Muslim conquests 
and victories during first ages of Islamic empires as well as during crusaders’ wars. 
Emotional and pathetic connotations of the meaning identify common ideas and objec­
tives among radicals who justify and glorify in that way terrorist attacks (Vidino, 
Hughes, 2015).
It should be pointed out that the communication in social medias also include 
code-switching, which concerns mixture of Arabic and English words and phrases as 
well as formal transcription of ISO (International Organization for Standard) or infor­
mal transcriptions of Arabic based on freestyle graphic equivalents. The concept is very 
popular in Internet mobile communications, especially among young Muslim genera­
tions. Internet users avoid translations of Arabic meanings in order to conserve symbolic 
character of words and their original semantic fields unavailable in Indo-European lan­
guages. However, conversation partners can’t write or type classic Arabic or they do 
know how to transcribe correctly the words.
Picture 2. The Examples of Arabic-English code-switching applied by jihadist in the Internet
messengers
Source: L. Vidino, S. Hughes (2015), ISIS in America: from Retweets to Raqqa. The Program on Extremism, 
Washington, p. 9-10.
1 The following examples refer to various profiles and accounts created in Twitter service by 
ISIS members or sympathizers of the organization. Many accounts do not exist anymore but they are 
all available in my provide archives and they collected in PDF or Screenshots.
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ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION
Recently, jihadists have applied advanced computer technologies such as hacking 
tools, mobile phone devices and encrypting programs, which facilitate protection of 
identity and conversations (Zetter, 2015).
For instance, in January 2016 ISIS hacked the TV station Bein HD 4 in order to 
spread its programs across the region (Webb, 2016). Bein HD 4 is a popular Arabic 
sport channel broadcasted by the Egyptian satellite provider Nilesat. The hacked station 
launched headlines about airstrikes, weather reports, lectures concerning jihadism and 
other propaganda materials that criticized al-Assad regime and glorified ISIS fighters.
ISIS also exploits vehicle communication and hidden codes. For example, in Janu­
ary 2016 British authorities foiled ISIS terror plot in the UK after intercepting suspi­
cious chatter between commercial airline pilots. The two pilots, who were leaving 
Amsterdam’s airport for the Middle Eastern, used coded language which made refer­
ence to pop music. They also used the emergency ‘Mayday’ frequency to discuss their 
terrorist plans (Robson, 2016).
The application of new technologies is also evident in the case of Telegram Messen­
ger. ISIS encourages its followers to start using that popular Internet application in or­
der to avoid surveillance. The Telegram has more than 50 million users, who send 
1 billion messages a day. It also guarantees privacy and encrypted audiovisual conver­
sations based on various communication channels (Smith, 2015).
Jihadists join the channels Akhbar al-Khilafa (Caliphate Information), Akhbar 
al-Jihad (Jihad Information), Isdarat al-Khilafa (Publications of the Caliphate) or 
Nuqta I ’lamiyya li-al-Dawla al-Islamiyya (Media Hotspot of the Islamic State) and 
Shajarat al-Khilafa (the Tree of the Caliphate). Each channel include thousands of 
member who transfer and share messages, pictures and videos or they follow online 
chats with other Telegram users. Apart from ideological and propaganda materials, the 
Telegram enables to share operational, logistic and financial updates and details con­
cerning ISIS activities, including preparation of terrorist attacks. The exchange of 
nearly 2000 photos, 14 voice message and 816 links demonstrate the growing influ­
ences of the application (Khan, 2015).
* * *
The research presented in the paper has demonstrated some innovative communica­
tion and propaganda techniques implemented by ISIS. Analysis of propaganda tech­
niques showed that all communication channels affected different audiences. For 
instance, speeches delivered in Arabic by ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi targeted 
local populations and stimulated their emotions, opinions and reactions thanks to litur­
gical style and implementation of non-verbal regulations of the sermon and traditional 
rhetorical devices.
Moreover, the agitation process reflected official websites, manifestos, online jour­
nals and statements released in various languages. ISIS leaders exploited the official 
communication channels to claim their responsibility for particular terrorist attacks and 
to present detailed information about damages and causalities. Besides, the official
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channels concerned appropriate style and narration as well as common graphics, colors 
and logotypes.
However, ISIS has also used social medias, which targeted Western audiences. Vari­
ous Internet accounts and Tweeter profiles enabled to express different propaganda ma­
terials such as ideological posts, high quality video films, sophisticated pictures and 
graphics that glorify jihadism and threat or condemn political opponents. The materials 
spread extremist ideas among internet users, recruited new fighters and inspired terror­
ist attacks.
The research presented in the paper also showed some new challenges for 
counterterrorism and cybersecurity policies in the world. It should be pointed out that it is 
more and more difficult to identify potential supporters, militants and terrorists because 
they use various avatars, profiles, symbols and particular Arabic hashtags that unite them 
and facilitate communication and exchange of materials. Besides, blocking of Twitter ac­
counts are ineffective because suspended profiles are replaced by new users who often 
change their avatars and profiles. Furthermore, implementation of advanced computer 
technologies, hacking tools or encrypting programs facilitate protection of identity and 
conversations and create additional risks for worldwide security.
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ABSTRACT
The present paper concerns studies on innovative communication and propaganda strategies 
of the main jihadist group called “the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). In fact, media and 
Internet agitations enabled to reinforce ideological and operational influences of that organiza­
tion and they affected different militants in the world who joined the battlefield in Syria and Iraq 
or carried out terrorist attacks in the West.
Analysis of propaganda techniques reflects the following topics: liturgical speeches, official 
media channels, social medias and encrypted communication. Besides, the research demon­
strates different audiences of ISIS communication strategy, which aims at affecting emotions 
and at stimulating opinions and reactions. The indoctrination concerns traditional, liturgical
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speeches delivered in Arabic by ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who targets local popula­
tions in mosques. Moreover, it also reflects new technologies such as radio and TV stations, offi­
cial websites or social medias that include sophisticated programs, high quality pictures, 
graphics and videos. However, the paper also deals with some advanced computer and Internet 
technologies, which enable to protect identities of jihadists who follow important conversations 
about ISIS objectives.
Key words: “Islamic State”, communication strategy, social media
STRATEGIA KOMUNIKACJI “PAŃSTWA ISLAMSKIEGO” 
STRESZCZENIE
Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy nowatorskich środków masowego przekazu wykorzystywanych 
przez czołowe ugrupowanie dżihadystyczne nazywane Państwem Islamskim. Odpowiednie 
techniki propagandowe wzmacniały zaplecze ideologiczne i operacyjne organizacji i wpływały 
na emocje i reakcje audytorium.
Istotnym punktem badań jest przedstawienie różnych form dyskursu, w zależności od danej 
grupy odbiorców sprzyjającej “Państwu Islamskiemu”. Zaprezentowane analizy obejmują na­
stępujące obszary: przemówienia liturgiczne, oficjalne kanały medialne, media społecznościowe
i komunikacja szyfrowana. Indoktrynacja dotyczy między innymi kazań polityczno-religijnych 
wygłaszanych przez przywódcę ugrupowania, Abu Bakra al-Baghdadiego. Badania dotyczą ta­
kże najnowszych mass-mediów (tj. stacji radiowych i telewizyjnych, stron internetowych, 
mediów społecznościowych). Środki masowego przekazu wykorzystywane przez “Państwo Is­
lamskie” uwzględniają regularne wpisy internetowe, anglojęzyczne oświadczenia, wysokiej ja ­
kości zdjęcia, grafiki i filmy adresowane do młodego pokolenia, w tym zachodnich dżihadystów, 
dla których tabloidyzacja przekazu stała się popularną formą komunikacji. Artykuł podejmuje 
również zagadnienia związane z zaawansowanymi technologiami komputerowymi i interneto­
wymi, które pozwalają chronić tożsamość dżihadystów, którzy, obok kwestii ideologicznych, 
poruszają istotne kwestie programowe i organizacyjne.
Słowa kluczowe: “Państwo Islamskie”, strategia komunikacji, media społecznościowe
